In a world of ever-increasing systems interdependence, effective cybersecurity policy design seems to be one of the most critically understudied elements of our national security strategy. Enterprise cyber technologies are often implemented without much regard to the interactions that occur between humans and the new technology. Furthermore, the interactions that occur between individuals can often have an impact on the newly employed technology as well. Without a rigorous, evidence-based approach to ground an employment strategy and elucidate the emergent organizational needs that will come with the fielding of new cyber capabilities, one is left to speculate on the impact that novel technologies will have on the aggregate functioning of the enterprise. In this paper, we will explore a scenario in which a hypothetical government agency applies a complexity science perspective, supported by agent-based modeling, to more fully understand the impacts of strategic policy decisions. We present a model to explore the socio-technical dynamics of these systems, discuss lessons using this platform, and suggest further research and development.
Introduction and Background
This paper deals with cyber defense decision making at a hypothetical large government agency. As evidenced by the recent creation of the US Senate Cybersecurity Subcommittee (http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/about/subcommittees) and the existence of US Cyber Command (http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/FactsheetView/Article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom) as well as specific priorities put forth within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber) and Department of Homeland Security (https://www.dhs.gov/topic/combating-cyber-crime), the US Government is critically interested in designing effective cybersecurity systems and policies. However effective these high-level efforts may be, the first line of defense in cyberspace is the individual system connected to the internet: the device coupled with the human directing it. Collectively, these individual systems are termed "end hosts" and the specific hardware involved includes computers, phones, and other webenabled devices. These systems are typically protected with passwords, private keys, firewalls, and traditional antivirus (AV) or antimalware software. Traditional AV solutions use a 'black listing' methodology [1], which blocks already known threats from being installed and/or executing. This type of methodology operates exclusively in a reactive mode; opening up the enterprise to 'zero-day,' or recently discovered, exploit vulnerability. The protection of end hosts and their local networks is known as cyber defense. The following discussion will focus on the AV solution space and prevention of unwanted code installation/execution.
